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Introduction   
Over the last ten years, the concept of ‘stabilization’ has been 
added to the lexicon of post-conflict reconstruction and develop-
ment. For several European donor countries, the United States 
and multilateral institutions, stability or stabilization frame-
works, programmes and missions have become a core element in 
response to violent conflict and other harbingers of state fragility. 
Over time, stabilization has become a buzzword in multiple 
contexts, often in disregard of its original meaning. This can cause 
confusion not only for outside observers, but also for policymak-
ers, practitioners and those who are supposed to benefit from 
stabilization programmes. 
In March 2014, the Rift Valley Institute (RVI), through the Rift 
Valley Forum—then the Nairobi Forum—together with the Univer-
sity of Gothenburg convened a regional conference on stabilization 
at the Kenya School of Government in Nairobi. The conference, 
‘Stabilization in Eastern and Central Africa: History, theory, policy 
and practice under scrutiny’, attracted some ninety participants 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and 
South Sudan —people involved in civil society, government, the 
UN and the donor and diplomatic communities. Academics and 
specialists from Europe and North America also participated.
The objective of the two-day conference was to question, 
review, evaluate and exchange lessons on stabilization 
programmes in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan with the aim of 
informing policies that enhance peace and security in eastern and 
central Africa. Discussions were structured around four themes: 
the history, theory and policies of stabilization operations; links 
between stabilization and security; stabilization in the context of 
peace frameworks and political settlements; and issues that arise 
when stabilization and development programmes meet.
This report presents highlights from this gathering and in no 
way aims to reproduce the debates and their conclusions in full. 
Giving space to voices from countries that are subject to stabili-
zation programmes is central to this report. Their statements, 
explanations and clarifications are complemented here by those 
of regional and international specialists and experienced practi-
tioners in international aid, development and stabilization. 
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The report does not provide a single answer or set of policy 
recommendations to the several issues touched upon. Rather, 
contrasting and sometimes contradictory perspectives stand at its 
heart. In that way, it is hoped, the text can be read as an active 
dialogue between multiple voices from the three sub-regions and 
beyond. One comment, sent to RVI after the event, exemplifies the 
critical nature of the event and the need for further debate:
The securitization/militarization of international aid 
and peacemaking efforts was treated at the conference 
as a mere technical and thus neutral exercise (and as 
such well within the approach of stabilization). The fact 
that stabilization undermines a generation or more of 
liberal values and efforts to keep both the military and 
military thinking apart from international aid was passed 
over at the conference in a far too cavalier manner. I 
hope the subject can be revisited, but take the form 
of a debate in which the many dimensions of this very 
controversial practice can be seriously examined (and 
hopefully rejected).
The report’s structure is organized along themes, rather than the 
individual debates as they occurred during the conference. Every 
effort has been made to reflect the viewpoints of the speakers. All 
those quoted are speaking on their own behalf, presenting their 
personal opinions and views, not those of their respective orga-
nizations. Each quote has been verified with and approved by the 
speaker. Some remain anonymous at the speakers’ request. Any 
errors that remain are the sole responsibility of the editors. 
This record relies on two main sources for documentation. 
Firstly, more than eight hours of audio recordings from the two 
days of discussion in the main conference room. Secondly, more 
than fifty pages of notes taken during breakout groups by four 
conference rapporteurs—Amina Abdulkadir, Willy Buloso, Moses 
Karanja and David Wagacha. Their work was coordinated and 
compiled by Elizabeth Spackman. RVI is grateful for their relent-
less focus and energy. A special thank you is owed to conference 
facilitators Mark Bradbury, Nuur Mohamud Sheekh and Philip 
Gourdin, to Ndanu Mung’ala, Sylvia Kitema and Charles Kyale for 
their logistical support, as well as to Daniel Watkins and Michel 
Thill for transcription and compiling this report from its sources.
Extracts from a background paper prepared for the confer-
ence by co-convenors Jan Bachmann and Peer Schouten from 
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the University of Gothenburg have been included in text boxes to 
complement the speakers’ voices. The conference was in English 
with simultaneous translation into French. The editors have trans-
lated all French quotes into English. 
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1. Setting the scene: Stabilization for beginners
A pessimist is an experienced optimist. 
–– Fred Ngoga
Fred Ngoga
The other day, I was flying to Nairobi from Mogadishu, and as we 
were about to stop at Wajir, the pilot told us to buckle up. When he 
said that, when he said to buckle up because it gets very bumpy, I 
thought to myself, ‘My God, we live in turbulent times!’
These are times where on the one hand, we have so many 
opportunities, and a lot of good things are happening, but at 
the same time, there are a lot of crises in the world. This region 
of ours is one that is on the one hand seeing high growth rates, 
regional investment, and the peaceful transition of power in 
many countries, but on the other hand civil wars in countries 
like Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and to some 
extent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well. And even 
more worrisome, the countries that have recently emerged from 
civil war are at risk of reverting back to turmoil.
Ken Menkhaus
You can’t help but feel the burden of history in a conversation like 
this. We’re working on three countries here—the DRC, Somalia, 
South Sudan—that have had some of the longest-running and 
worst crises in the world over the past 50 years. A lot of blood 
has been spilt, and the fact that it has been so difficult to make 
progress—the fact that there has been so big a failure, blamed 
across the board—international actors, local actors, national 
government—is a heavy burden. 
But as we listen to these three cases, it’s also a reminder of the 
extraordinary degree of difficulty that actors face in trying to make 
these crises right, trying to fix them in a context where we’ve had 
protracted crises that have been going on now in some cases for 
15, 20 years or more. 
Protracted conflicts have their own pathologies; they create 
their own adaptations. Everyone adapts to the new realities. These 
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Background
International responses to violent conflict during the 1990s, for 
example in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Rwanda, exposed a 
general lack of civilian expertise for post-conflict situations and the 
need for peacekeepers to operate—both when there was a peace 
to keep and during conflict. As early as 1992, the European Union 
started to spearhead increased coordination of civilian and military 
efforts within international humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations.
 In the aftermath of 9/11, however, greater coordination and 
coherence between development agencies, diplomacy and military 
units was said to be necessary in the context of fragile states, 
eventually resulting in ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole-of-government’ 
approaches. The line of argument is that addressing the unique 
problems in different contexts of fragility, from Afghanistan to 
Haiti, requires a broad repertoire of instruments: hard and soft; 
civilian and military; short-term security and long-term economic 
development. 
 The coordination of civilian and military actors is the primary 
element of all stabilization frameworks. Arguably, however, the 
turning point in stabilization policy was the US military’s realization 
in Iraq and Afghanistan of the need to combine, as a second 
element, short-term coercive pacification and long-term capacity-
building and peace-building—simultaneously. Much of current 
understanding and practice in stabilization was developed during 
the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These include 
joint civil–military teams, military units engaged in infrastructure 
rehabilitation in order to ‘win hearts and minds’, and joint funding 
mechanisms.
 In the last decade, however, stability or stabilization 
frameworks and missions have mushroomed in Western responses 
to armed conflicts and state fragility. The UN, the United States, 
the UK, Denmark, Australia and the Netherlands have all 
institutionalized their stabilization policies in the form of inter-
departmental stabilization units and task forces, and in some cases 
inter-agency funding pools to pay for conflict prevention or crisis 
response. In addition, multi-lateral peacekeeping missions apply 
stabilization approaches in each of these contexts.
adaptations can create systems, systems in which livelihoods are 
made, food is produced, trade is brokered, systems of politics, 
systems of international response. Along with those systems, 
over time, comes a political culture that can be quite resistant 
to change. 
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Philip Winter
I started my career in Africa in 1975, in what was then Southern 
Sudan. I decided to write down some of the nostrums that I’ve 
lived through and bumped up against to give you an idea that 
‘stabilization’ is a relatively recent aspiration of the international 
community and is something exogenous. 
I wrote down, off the top of my head, with no research, no 
notes: stages of growth, economic take-off, export-led growth, 
basic needs, integrated rural development, rights-based program-
ming, do-no-harm, capacity-building, stabilization, protection, 
conflict drivers and conflict advisers. We’ve all bumped into 
these concepts. We’ve all met people who tell us they are conflict 
analysts, or conflict advisers, and we are entitled to be sceptical—
because these are exogenous, externally driven responses to 
internal crises of governance.
The international community, when it gets involved in a 
‘complex emergency’, likes to bring its recipes, its nostrums if 
you like—protection of civilians, stabilization, whatever—into the 
picture. And it operates in ways that may not be at all informed 
by the way local people operate. So whilst there are many people 
who learnt a lot from South Sudan, you can’t expect new relief 
workers or peacekeepers to understand the environment they’re 
operating in, and the result is that they don’t.
Mvemba Dizolele
History is important. As an example, let’s take SSR [security sector 
reform]. If your narrative says, ‘The Congo has never had an 
army, and it has always been this way’, then whatever half-baked 
solution you bring is going to seem good to you. You say to yourself, 
‘Because nothing has ever worked here, this is good!’ But if you 
say, ‘Well, Congo did have an army. Zaire used to have an army. 
Zaire used to have a very strong air force. It was Zaire that helped 
the US in Angola. It was Zaire that stopped Qaddafi in Chad. What 
happened to that military?’—if you start thinking about it—you 
won’t talk about your ideas for SSR. Historically, there have been 
plenty of bilateral military co-operations. What happened to that? 
Rather than come in with whatever solution you want, it behoves 
us to go back and see.
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2. Stabilization in theory
I came to this conference with a considerable amount of 
confusion as to what stabilization is and was, and I guess I was 
partly reassured when, as I was discussing it with a group of 
South Sudanese yesterday, everybody in the group was equally 
as confused as I was.
–– John Young
From the academy 
Ken Menkhaus
We all know that academics love to take apart concepts. We 
deconstruct them, we unpack them, and we problematize them. 
When it goes wrong, it turns into an internal parlour game to see 
who’s the cleverest person to play semantics. But when it’s done 
right, this exercise has three really important advantages: clarity, 
precision, and revelation.
We have been talking about compatibility versus trade-offs for 
50 or 60 years. Yet in those instances where we have two goods 
that appear to collide, often we have come up with a new concept 
that actually helps us get past the apparent impasse. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, we had an apparent impasse between two goods—
environmental protection and economic development—and they 
seemed to be at complete loggerheads. There was a trade-off: if 
you want economic growth and development, it comes at a cost 
for the environment.
Well, we worked on it, and we worked on it in lots of workshops 
like this, and the world came up with the concept of sustainable 
development: if you can’t pass on development from one genera-
tion to the next, because you are undermining the environment, it 
is not development. That reframed the entire relationship between 
these two goods in a very constructive way.
Could we pull that off with some of the goods in stabilization? 
Can we find a new way to think about some of these goals and 
objectives, which sometimes appear in the field to collide with one 
another, to advance the overall objective of stabilization, which as 
we know, is to create an environment in post-war settings where 
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populations can enjoy security and order and justice and economic 
development and governance?
Judith Verweijen
The discussions that take place today around stabilization remind 
me of a classic article by Giovanni Sartori from 1970 called 
‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’. In 1970, Sartori 
said, I quote, 
Background
Given the connotations of the term ‘stability’ during the Cold 
War, the recent rise of the concept of stabilization operations 
is surprising. Generally speaking, stabilization frameworks 
evolved within the discussion on the links between security and 
development. The notion that security and development are 
interlinked, and therefore have to be thought of and acted upon 
together, has shaped foreign policy towards Africa since the 
mid-1990s.
 Two developments within the security–development nexus are 
of particular interest to understanding the rise of stabilization as a 
concept. First, the emphasis on 1990s development policy on post-
conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention; and second, the call 
for closer civil–military coordination within peacekeeping missions. 
 Unsurprisingly, an analysis of different approaches to 
stabilization presents an ambiguous picture of the concept. While 
some actors, such as Denmark or the UK, initially saw the concept 
as stopping short of state-building, others, such as the UN and 
European Union, avoided deeper engagement. For a number of 
countries, including the United States and the UK, stabilization 
provided a platform for building up domestic civilian expertise as 
well as civil–military coordination mechanisms for post-conflict 
settings. In the meantime, the concept evolved to denote an 
abundance of different types of intervention, including counter-
insurgency, early recovery, reconstruction, peace-building, and 
state-building. 
 Policy documents on stabilization argue that there can 
be no one-size-fits-all solution to prevent or resolve conflict. 
Stabilization arguably provides the flexibility to address a number 
of security and development issues. The British military put it aptly: 
‘Stabilization is a creative process, not a science’.*
* Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation: The Military’s Contribution, Joint 
Publication Doctrine 3-40, Swindon, Wiltshire: Ministry of Defence, 2009, https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/
jdp3_40a4.pdf. 
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The larger the world, the more we have resorted to conceptual 
stretching or conceptual straining—that is, to vague, amorphous 
conceptualizations. To be sure, there is more to it: One may 
add, for example, that conceptual stretching also represents a 
deliberate attempt to make our conceptualizations ‘value-free’. 
These considerations notwithstanding, the net result of concep-
tual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be 
matched by loss in connotative precision. It appears that we can 
cover more only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less 
precise manner.1
Somehow I thought it very striking to apply Sartori’s concept of 
conceptual stretching to the semantic confusions around stabiliza-
tion. And there’s an idea also from Arturo Escobar that he sets out 
in ‘Encountering Development’, where he explains how the ‘devel-
opment discourse’ needs to constantly reinvent itself discursively.2 
So, according to him, whether it’s called ‘development’ or ‘stabili-
zation’, there’s always a need for some sort of reinvention in order 
to mask the constant failures of all these efforts to actually change 
things on the ground. 
In the field
Hugo de Vries
If you think that there is no strategy for stabilization, please read 
the revised I4S, the revised stabilization framework.3 We spent a 
year with the government and everybody revising it.
Background
There is an extreme diversity of approaches, goals, instruments, 
and projects gathered under the heading of ‘stabilization’. As such, 
practice mirrors the conceptual variety—or the indeterminate  
nature—of stabilization.
 Interestingly, a number of states and institutions running large 
programmes under the label ‘stabilization’ do not offer a definition 
of the term. In the case of the UN, other than in the name of its 
stabilization missions, the term is rarely mentioned in official 
documents and its meaning is ambiguous at best.
1 Giovanni Sartori, 
‘Concept Misformation 
in Comparative Politics’, 
American Political Science 
Review 64/4 (1970), 
1033–53 (1034).
2 Arturo Escobar, 
Encountering Development: 
The Making and Unmaking 
of the Third World, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995.
3 United Nations 
Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo, 
Stabilization Support Unit, 
‘International Security 
and Stabilization Support 
Strategy 2013–2017: 
Executive Summary’, 
28 October 2013.
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Emily Paddon
According to the new plan [the I4S], stabilization is to be, I quote, 
‘an integrated, holistic but targeted process of enabling state and 
society to build mutual accountability and capacity to address 
and mitigate existing or emerging drivers of violent conflict, 
creating the conditions for improved governance and longer term 
development’.4
Anonymous
In Somalia, AMISOM is the only security enabler at the moment. 
It’s the only actor that can provide any form of security in Somalia. 
Does it make sense to push stabilization per se? In Somalia, it’s 
part of a larger discourse, which is the New Deal,5 which at the 
moment is very much on paper and not a reality. But probably 
this is the trend we should look at: not to perpetrate stabilization 
discourse per se, but to integrate it into much larger priorities for 
the country.’
Is everyone on the same page?
Ken Menkhaus
What we are doing is looking at the different components of what 
we have come to call stabilization, development, state-building, 
Background 
I4S and STAREC, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,  
comprise the most elaborate and explicit example of international 
stabilization. Their approach is to restore state authority in 
the conflict-afflicted eastern provinces of the DRC by building 
infrastructure and deploying state agents, complemented by 
UN-supported efforts of the Congolese army (FARDC) to disarm 
rebels.
 Stabilization efforts in the DRC are, however, marked by some 
challenges: persistent conflict, poor local perceptions, and the 
technical focus and fragmentation of the international agenda. 
Donors tend to invest only in one-time community support efforts. 
Stabilization has not been applied in South Sudan, if by stabilization 
one means holistic approaches combining security on a political 
level with longer-term investments. 
4 MONUSCO, ‘International 
Security and Stabilization 
Support Strategy 
2013–2017’. 
5 Federal Republic of 
Somalia, ‘The Somali 
Compact’, Mogadishu, 2013.
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peace-building, military peace enforcement, etc. We are looking at 
how all of them interact with one another. In stabilization, we’ve 
got a lot of new tools at our disposal. We are equipped with tools 
and concepts, processes and strategies, that we would have loved 
to have had in 1992/93 in South Sudan or Somalia. It’s impressive. 
But one also gets the impression that much as we did in UNOSOM 
in 1993, we’re still kind of making it up as we go along.
Anonymous
I just would like to ask whether it’s important or necessary to 
educate mainstream people about the concept of stabilization? In 
South Sudan, all we know is humanitarian relief and development 
assistance. Anything that has been built, whether it’s a clinic or 
it’s infrastructure through the stabilization programme, they call 
development assistance or humanitarian relief, something like 
that.
Emily Paddon
In 2011 and 2012, I led a series of focus groups in South Kivu and 
North Kivu, with different communities, where we talked about 
stabilization and what it meant. What became clear was that it 
had come to mean very different things to different people. There 
was a lot of misunderstanding and confusion amongst communi-
ties. One member of civil society even referred to it in derogatory 
terms, as a ‘gros mot’ or ‘swear word’. International actors were 
similarly confused about it’s meaning, and different interpreta-
tions persisted amongst humanitarians, donors, and the different 
components of the UN mission.
Politically useful, intentionally vague
Stuart Gordon
Stabilization presented some really useful concepts to government 
ministries in the UK, USA, and elsewhere. It provided a rallying 
point around which careers could be developed, and it echoed 
agendas, particularly those of the UK, to horizontally link up devel-
opment and the military.
There also needed to be a political context in which humani-
tarianism was set. The absence of a political framework in which 
humanitarianism was instrumentalized to deliver political effects 
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was a problem. Where does humanitarianism sit? What are these 
responses of development and diplomatic actors?
Stabilization thus became a rallying point for different elements 
and interests. Events created a pressure to push towards a more 
joined-up agenda; the contents from very different government 
departments were brought together—institutional capacity 
building, political settlements, security sector reform, service 
delivery, building state legitimacy, governance, which really came 
from the development community looking at fragile states, and 
hearts and minds, which came from military agendas.
But I think such a vague term is dangerous—such an all- 
encompassing term—because it means that everything that can 
demonstrate that it has some relevance towards stabilization, 
broadly defined, can be legitimized and justified. And it impacts 
most definitely on prioritization and sequencing activities. There’s 
a finite amount of money, there’s a finite amount of policymakers’ 
time.
There was a lot of talk in the early days of stabilization planning 
about creating ‘critical paths towards stability’, trying to prioritize 
certain actions and putting them in a certain sequence in order 
to deliver the conditions under which other forms of develop-
ment could take place. The danger is, if you say that everything 
falls under the ‘emergency stabilization phase’, and everything is 
equally relevant, it absorbs time, it absorbs the money available, 
and it muddies the policy picture about what you need to do first. 
What we have created is a set of institutions for people with 
certain skill sets that need to demonstrate relevance to the 
concept of stabilization rather than, necessarily, relevance to the 
critical path to stability for the state that they’re dealing with.
Hugo de Vries
What we have seen over the years in Congo is that the more vague 
you keep such a concept, the easier it is for agencies, NGOs, etc., to 
sell a project as being ‘stabilization’ while doing exactly the same 
thing they would have done in any other circumstances, calling 
it ‘state authority’ or ‘early recovery’ or whatever. So there’s a 
financial incentive behind that as well. We need to be careful not 
to dilute the concept of stabilization too much by adding every-
thing to it, and end up with it being nothing. 
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Joanna Nickolls
It’s difficult to define whether things count as humanitarian or if 
they count as early recovery or if they count as stabilization. So if 
we have an ECHO-funded health clinic in an area with high death 
rates, that can count as humanitarian. If a similar intervention with 
a similar health clinic is funded by the stability fund and is labelled 
as linked to the government, that can count as stabilization. The 
definitions are, whilst in theory quite clear, in practice quite hazy.
Emily Paddon
Stabilization is a concept that has increased in popularity in part 
because it helps make sense, or it gives the impression of making 
sense, of a complex landscape. It aims to focus priorities and to 
provide a funding structure and coordination mechanism, all of 
which are needed to engage in the particular contexts in which it’s 
now so prevalent as a concept. 
It is not an entirely new concept, as others have stated. There 
is a recycling of the organizing concepts and frameworks that are 
used by international actors. However, I think it is important to 
recognize that the scale of ambition and the types of projects 
being pursued today by international actors are different than 10 
or 15 years ago. 
Anna Schmidt
The story goes that the UN was asked by the Somali government 
to provide a list of its stabilization activities, but got a bit stuck 
because of different interests in labelling something stabilization—
some did not want to have an activity they were doing to be called 
‘stabilization’—so in the end, there was a list of what people were 
doing in specific areas so the government could make up its own 
mind on how to classify them.
From the ground up
Anonymous
I find it ironic that we are sitting here talking about the failures of 
the international system, recognizing the need to integrate local 
voices, or rather, consult local voices. And yet I feel like South 
Sudan is being sidelined in this discussion. If you look at the voices 
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speaking, there is only one South Sudanese. The rest are people 
from the international so-called experts. 
I find it really offensive that we would be talking here about 
South Sudan when we have in the audience capable South 
Sudanese who can articulate some of these issues. Why were 
we called to come and listen to the experts? I should have not 
wasted my time to come from Addis yesterday to listen to this, 
especially when we are being hypocritical: we are criticizing the 
same practices that we are engaged in right now.
Abdirashid Hashi
The paper talks about the Danish and the Norwegians and the 
British and the EU. And yet Somalia is a country. It has a people. 
They have ideas, they have values, they have skills. They have 
stabilization efforts in Somaliland and Puntland. We have stability 
there! We could have held this conference in Hargeysa!
Anonymous
Stabilization is a word that animates the donor community, but it’s 
not in the Sudanese lexicon.
Emmanuel Kabengele
One can feel it is a bit as if the voices of the communities are not 
listened to sufficiently by I4S. 
Geoffrey Lou Duke
Context is king. Not only at the national level, but at the local level. 
To me, that means that we have to rethink our design of develop-
ment and stabilization strategies. It has to begin from below and 
then come up and connect the various dynamics. 
William Deng Deng
One of my colleagues said, ‘We don’t mind expertise from 
outside. But please send us expertise with experience’. Don’t send 
24-year-old kids to advise sixty-year-old men. There’s something 
fundamentally wrong with that.
Personally, I compare stabilization to structural adjustment. I 
was going to primary school in Kenya when structural adjustment 
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was just coming in, and Kenya went through it horribly, along with 
many others. Their economies today, how do they fare?
Now, you talk about stabilization and a New Deal. How 
different is that? Somebody sits somewhere and decides how I am 
supposed to be feeling. How does that work? I’m supposed to be 
the one that tells you that I’m feeling this way, then we investigate 
it, and we work together.
Mvemba Dizolele
People challenge the notion of stabilization programmes, whether 
it is humanitarian or military missions, because they feel that the 
programmes are Western responses to their crises. What people 
are calling for is their own solution to their crisis, because they 
understand their crisis better. People across these regions are 
ready to assert their own right to self-determination, and this is 
really key.
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3. Stabilization and politics
Each different interpretation of stabilization is based on a 
different reading of the causes of violence in a certain context.
–– Judith Verweijen
The first 500 years 
Joanna Nickolls
According to a recent study, the fastest political transformations 
take a generation. If you look at the time it takes to get corruption 
under control, it’s 27 years.6 That’s under reasonable control, not 
to eliminate it. Arguably some of our international time frames are 
significantly shorter than that. We have diplomats, aid workers, 
who have a three-to-five-year, maybe ten-year horizon in which 
they want to deliver change. There is not much international 
incentive structured around beginning a project that might reap 
benefits in 27 years.
Ken Menkhaus
Political science doesn’t have a whole lot to offer by way of laws 
of nature or findings that are ironclad. But one of the things that 
political science research has proven pretty conclusively is that 
political institutionalization takes a long time. I was at a confer-
ence not long ago where a wag from Harvard said, ‘The hard part 
of state-building is really the first 500 years.’
Background
There is an increasing state focus in the stabilization approaches 
to Somalia. This seems due to improved international trust in 
the Federal Government of Somalia, which, however, remains a 
structure entirely dependent on international funding, support, 
and security. There is a real challenge—which remains—in 
establishing a central state while navigating and engaging local 
authorities, who might be pivotal for access but who at the same 
time might also become spoilers.
6 World Bank, World 
Development Report 2011: 
Conflict, Security, and 
Development, Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2011, 2 
and 108. Accessed 5 January 
2016, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTWDRS/
Resources/WDR2011_Full_
Text.pdf. 
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Anonymous
In South Sudan, local justice, local security, seem to work at the 
local state level because people in power have been there for over 
50 years, and continuity is what they believe to work. They know 
what can work. Institutional memory should be carried forward if 
we are to have a stable country.
Anonymous
South Sudan has 11 constitutions: there is a national constitu-
tion and ten state constitutions. But there is no judiciary in these 
states. So we have ten states with ten constitutions, but with no 
judiciary as a third arm of the government. This means the eleven 
constitutions will have to be interpreted by the national judiciary, 
which by and large sits in Juba and does not reach the population. 
William Deng Deng
In South Sudan, we have not studied what skills we need to 
run a state. Yes, we were a very effective, struggling liberation 
movement, but can we really run a state? This has not been looked 
at. It was pushed aside, and we said, ‘Oh, we’ll have stabilization, 
we’ll put in money’, but when they see the money, that’s it.
We, as a government, must be able to sit with our own commu-
nities and face our own truth and reconciliation, because some of 
us made mistakes. But we have not done that. We have not apol-
ogized to our people.
Judith Verweijen
We have referred to the security–development nexus, but I do also 
wonder if the roots of the idea that security and development are 
connected are much older? If we look at colonial policy, and espe-
cially if we look at early counter-insurgency interventions, some 
people say that development was born in the context of count-
er-insurgency, actually, referring to the Mau Mau campaigns of the 
British in Kenya.
Mvemba Dizolele
If you are around for 15 years, to the tune of USD 1.5 billion, and 
your 15-page mandate covers everything from elections to training 
to everything, you are trying to substitute for the state. You either 
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have to take full responsibility for that, or you will have to start 
exiting so the state can do its work.
Judith Verweijen
You hear a lot of contradictions. On the one hand, we are too state 
centred; we should focus on non-state actors. On the other hand, 
every time, what comes up is constitutions, legal frameworks, and 
everything for which you actually need a strong state. So somehow, 
are we trapped in the state straitjacket in our thinking? Or is there 
simply not a viable way to conceptualize political order outside of 
the state? It’s an open question.
Intervention as politics
Emmanuel Kabengele
We think there is a very obvious link between politics and the 
aspects of stabilization.
Fred Ngoga
Building an army is a political endeavour. You cannot build an 
army unless you have your politics right. In the case of Somalia, 
you have the issue of federalism first before you can set up your 
Somali armed forces. Today the reality is, we have 20,000 forces 
we have built up so far in Somalia. But these forces still act like 
clan militias because of issues related to federalism and political 
representation.
Stuart Gordon
Stabilization legitimizes a certain toolbox from the international 
community, and it mobilizes responses around those. And what 
that leads to, essentially, is a technical set of solutions to problems 
that are actually political and essentially local. Ultimately, all crises 
are local. The local matters.
Judith Verweijen
I coined the concept ‘rebels in suits’, because often we have the 
idea that rebels are only the military guys with the guns. However, 
what we see in the Congo is that there is a whole apparatus of 
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civilian actors—provincial MPs, etc.—who support armed groups 
directly or indirectly.
Emily Paddon
International stabilization policies and practices do not exist in a 
vacuum. Peacekeepers as well as other international actors are 
parties and agents to the conflict that they are engaging in. They 
influence dynamics and the course of events in various ways even 
when they are inconsistent in implementing those policies. They 
raise expectations and create incentives amongst the local actors, 
and in doing so they encourage particular types of behaviour that 
would not have occurred otherwise.
Civilians who are told that they are going to be protected 
make decisions based on that basis. Similarly, armed actors, and 
particularly state actors, respond to the constraints and opportu-
nities afforded by stabilization plans as well as other international 
policies. For those seeking a continuation of conflict, stabilization 
may have considerable political and strategic consequences, and 
they respond to that. They may be attacked, they may be marginal-
ized by future peace or political processes, they may be sanctioned 
by the Security Council, and in some cases, they may be investi-
gated by the ICC. Given these stakes, they respond. They change 
their behaviour based on that.
I think the laudable aims underpinning international efforts 
in Congo and elsewhere, that which motivates many of us in this 
room today—things like security, protection, statebuilding—are 
important. They really matter, and they should continue to inform 
the ways in which we engage, but I don’t think we can talk about 
stabilization in apolitical terms. It’s inherently political, and in my 
view, we have to start with that.
Uninvited intervention
Anonymous
Looking at developments during 2005, soon after the formation of 
the first transitional federal government [in Somalia], we had the 
Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), jointly done by the World Bank and 
UNDP, which resulted in the production of the Somali Reconstruc-
tion and Development Programme (RDP), which in Hargeysa was 
more of a framework than a programme. The New Deal seems to 
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be deriving from Norway, Brussels, not even from Mogadishu. If 
we have the RDP, why not do another JNA, update that document, 
and use that? It was more Somali than the New Deal.
Edward Rackley
Even those that claim political neutrality and impartiality, they also 
become, by their very presence, actors in a theatre. They have 
effects; some of them are perverse, some of them are positive. 
Does that mean incompatibility? In the spirit of prudence and 
humility, are we the right actors? Us in the room, are we the right 
type of actors to be delivering stability?
Ken Menkhaus
In Somalia [in 1992], we were going in uninvited to a place—where 
there was no state to invite us in the first place—to try to impose 
peace. I was there at the time. I can assure you: we were making 
it up as we were going along. There were no rules. We had to set 
a precedent with virtually every decision that was being made in 
a context where we had very few people who knew much about 
the country.
The longer the presence of foreign troops in Somalia, the more 
local resistance and unhappiness. This is not just true in Somalia 
but everywhere in the world.
Almost everywhere that the international community inter-
venes, we [the international community] are often more of a 
problem than a solution. Everywhere. And I think we need to take 
that as a given. One needs to operate on the assumption that 
the international community, writ large—not just the UN and the 
Western donors —but all of the international actors who have 
their fingers in your problem are just a given. And you are going to 
have to work through it despite, not because of, but despite, us. If 
you can take that approach, it will allow you to move on instead of 
constantly trying to get us to do better. 
Neutrality and impartiality in a stabilization mission are very 
difficult to achieve. Almost every decision you make harms some 
interests and helps others. I don’t know that the international 
community can do a whole lot better than it is doing now. It’s a big 
improvement over 20 years ago. 
Whether we are governments in the region, national or local, 
international aid, or diplomats, we often fashion stabilization 
projects, programmes, and strategies forgetting that locals have 
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agency. Whatever we do is going to create conditions and incen-
tives that people locally will react to. Not only do they have agency, 
but they are playing on their home field. We are playing checkers, 
and they are playing chess. I think a lot of the time when stabili-
zation fails, it is because we fail to account for the simple fact that 
people locally will react and adapt to whatever we are doing.
Anonymous
People believe these people [AMISOM] are here for their own 
interests. The majority of Somalis believe this. And the background 
to what I am saying is, each AU [African Union] troop earns about 
USD 2000–3,000 a month. They are in a big mechanized vehicle. 
Somalis earn USD 100 a month. If they get sick, they earn nothing. 
Sometimes for three months, they do not get paid. So tell me, 
given this background, with all the money spent on AU troops, and 
nothing to Somalis, how will we achieve security in Somalia? Can 
these troops stay forever?
Fred Ngoga
Even your brother, when he comes to stay on your couch—one 
day is good, two days is okay, three days, you want to invite him 
to leave. We appreciate that; we understand that. But please do 
understand we [peacekeepers] have a job to do. We are not doing 
it for ourselves or for that money 
Abdirashid Hashi
In the past 20 years, the international community has been one 
of the biggest actors in the Somali situation. The failure and the 
fragility we see now is a collective problem. It’s a collective failure. 
Maybe it was the Somalis’ omission. Maybe we failed to take 
responsibility and fix our country. 
Anonymous
In the DRC, where most of my experience is, that same impres-
sion is really widespread as well among the Congolese—that this 
mission [MONUSCO] is just a money-eating machine, and what 
they’re doing is not really anything.
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William Deng Deng
With the regional powers intervening in South Sudan, I use the 
phrase the ‘two Ps’: passivity and panic. Right now, the regional 
powers are panicking. I have been coming here, to Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, and I have been saying, ‘The things you are ignoring will 
blow up in our faces’. And they said, ‘Oh, you’re being too critical’. 
And yet, eventually it did blow up in our faces. These are things 
we could have addressed in 2006, 2007, and 2008. But the inter-
national community, you can’t discern where they stand. You can’t 
discern their interests.
Judith Verweijen
The competition between elites takes place at local, national, and 
regional levels, and there is a constant interaction with these levels 
of conflict dynamics. This makes it really difficult to intervene. 
Even if Kigali and Kinshasa get their act together, there remains 
at the local level a whole host of issues that spiral out of control. 
By contrast, if you only intervene at the local level, and work on 
community reconciliation, there is a real risk that, for example, 
national elites will continue to mobilize violently. So a real 
challenge is what is the appropriate level of intervention in DRC?
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4. Stabilization and security
A friend told me that to better stabilize, one first has 
to destabilize.
–– Rémy Kasindi
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Emily Paddon
Whilst halting armed group activity, building up local capacities and 
fostering dialogue is important, for stabilization to be lasting and 
real, national institutions will have to be reformed in the Congo. 
And the underlying political issues, which are local, national and 
regional, will have to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
However, time and time again, the government and the parties 
on the ground have done little to indicate a genuine willingness 
to pursue reform. Without such reforms, I think we must ask the 
hard questions of what continuing to support the state is actually 
delivering and the real effects it has on the prospects of long-term 
stability in Congo.
Loochi Muzaliwa
I think that we talk too much as if we’re in the church sometimes, 
with all the best intentions in the world, but we still do not manage 
to touch on the interests of the parties [donors]. But, what about 
the interests of the parties? Why are all these states giving millions 
of dollars? It is true that some are looking for their own stability. 
Nobody has an interest in a burning Congo, for example, otherwise 
one would not have access to its resources. 
In the Congo, we have all these debates around mineral 
resources, the protection of forests, the management of water, of 
the Inga Dam, etc. If South Africa is there, it is not because South 
Africa loves the Congo, but because South Africa is looking for the 
energy that will come from Inga III. So I think that if we like to speak 
of stabilization, we should take into account all these interests of 
different states. 
RV I STA B I L I ZAT I O N CO N F E R E N C E 201428
Hugo de Vries
There is a little bit of confusion about this concept of ‘island of 
stability’, which has popped up. Islands of stability are basically 
quick impact projects. They are not linked to a broader theory of 
stabilization. They are basically showing the flag right after oper-
ations, but because we call them islands of stability, there is a 
certain confusion with broader stabilization, and that is becoming 
a big problem.
Emily Paddon
I take issue with this idea of ‘islands of stability’. They are temporary 
solutions, and they are geographically discrete. What happens 
outside those islands? What is to say that the conflict will not be 
displaced, as it has in the past? 
Operationalization of these plans has centred largely on a 
counter-insurgency model of clear-hold-build, whereby targeted 
clearing operations are conducted by the intervention brigade 
and/or the FARDC [spell out]. Once freed from armed groups, the 
mission, as well as other international and national actors, are 
then tasked with providing rapid support to hold and build within 
the area, coordinated under the I4S. 
Judith Verweijen
In Congo, there is the dilemma of where are you going to 
intervene. There is a vast area wherein armed mobilization takes 
place, ranging from North Katanga to Haute Uele, where the LRA 
is active. There are simply not the military or financial resources 
to intervene in all of these places at the same time, so you must 
prioritize. What rebel groups are you going to attack or deal with 
first? Where are you going to work? 
However, in this case, if you choose a strategy that focuses 
on specific areas, there is the risk of creating security vacuums. 
When you start military operations in a certain place, troops 
are withdrawn from another area, creating a vacuum that other 
groups jump into. We have seen this with the expansion of Raia 
Mutomboki in 2011, which profited from the absence of the 
Congolese army.
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Somalia
Ken Menkhaus
I would like to begin by asking the question, Whose security are 
we talking about? Because depending on how you answer that 
question, you come up with very different policy problems. Is it 
the security of global and regional actors? Is it the security of the 
Somali state and government? Or is it the security of the Somali 
people? 
If what we do in Somalia does not improve or protect the 
security of the Somali people, then we really shouldn’t be there in 
the first place. And we must not assume that stabilization is a goal 
that is shared by everyone. There are war economies. There are 
populations, there are elites, again both locally and internationally, 
that embrace stabilization as a project, not as a goal.
The introduction of resources in Somalia of any type is a 
conflict-producing exercise. Somali communities, Somali elites will 
engage in conflict over these resources to the extent that almost 
everything we talked about that falls under the rubric of stabi-
lization is an introduction of resources. We could conclude that 
stabilization exercises ironically produce the very conflict that we 
are hoping to control. This is inevitable, but it can be controlled, 
with good local contexts, with good national officers and project 
development, and humanitarian aid, state-building aid. These can 
produce controllable conflict. There is nothing wrong with conflict. 
Our problem in Somalia is when it spills over into armed conflict.
Somaliland, which has remained peaceful for most of the last 
23 years, has existed on a federal budget until recently of about 
USD 50 million a year. It was not a lot to fight over. The stakes 
were lower, they could work it out. When you introduce bigger 
resources, you introduce the risk of much fiercer political conflict.
Foreign military intervention, which dominates the political 
landscape in Somalia today, can successfully protect the Somali 
government on most days and international organizations and their 
staff on most days. But not the Somali people. The key counter-
insurgency actors on the international level are inadvertently, for 
short-term reasons, undermining the state-building agenda, which 
is to build command and control over the security forces. 
Most of the stabilization operations that we [as observers] 
have worked with around the world have either been [in the 
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context of] a victor’s peace—where one side comes in, they win, 
the others lose, and they impose the new rules of the game—or a 
stalemate—when no one has won, they’ve fought themselves to 
exhaustion, and now you create a transitional government, power 
sharing, cut the cake. No one wins, no one loses in that, at least in 
the short term. 
South Sudan
John Young
As I look to the concept of stabilization more and listen to the 
people who know an awful lot more about this than I do, what I am 
starting to see in some ways is that although this is being presented 
as a new theme, in many ways you can look at a lot of the devel-
opment in Sudan, particularly during the peace processes, through 
the lens of this notion of stabilization.
The exception to this kind of security-stabilization orientation 
by donors in South Sudan was the commitment to democratiza-
tion. But what we saw as the process unfolded, specifically with 
respect to the 2010 elections, was that the elections were, to 
put it mildly, deeply flawed. The approach of the international 
community to those failures of the election was basically to say, 
‘It doesn’t really matter. We can go on. We are not going to let this 
flawed election disrupt the peace process’. 
By saying that, by making this kind of analysis, they were really 
saying that democratization was not the goal of the peace process. 
The goal was this security kind of approach. So that was what they 
focused on. But at the end of the day, when we look back to what 
the specific objectives of the peace process were, we can see that 
it was basically a complete failure in its own terms.
But despite those very clear failures of the peace process 
leading up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, when 
the next conflict arose, this internal war in South Sudan, the inter-
national community went back to the very same peace process, 
very same structure, again done through IGAD, again done with 
the backing of the Troika of the United States, Britain and Norway, 
even led by the same mediator, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, from 
Kenya. It’s been very much the same kind of process and, thus far, 
the same focus on security: on reaching the cessation of hostili-
ties and agreeing on conflict-monitoring groups. And both of those 
have formally been agreed to, but in fact the conflict itself still goes 
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on, and the monitoring mechanism has not taken form at all. So 
again, we see the same kind of thrust on security, on stabiliza-
tion, and thus far the same kind of failures, as if nothing had been 
learned from the earlier peace process at all.
There’s been an enormous expenditure of human and financial 
resources by all of these agencies, by the South Sudanese state, 
by the international community, on the provision of security in 
South Sudan, and the result, probably, is to increase the insecurity, 
and the agents themselves who have been involved in providing 
security have become drivers of insecurity. 
Anonymous
When I was in northern Bahr el-Ghazal in April last year, surveying 
the community perception of the UN mandate on the protection 
of civilians, they told me, ‘What, the UN? No, we see them going 
from Gok Machar to Aweil, but what are they supposed to be 
doing again? They are supposed to be protecting us? Well, go tell 
them and let them come and talk to us, because we have ideas 
about how they can protect us’. Is it really rocket science for us to 
figure this out? 
This is where I tend to agree with Graham Hancock, in his book 
Lords of Poverty, that the international community aid system is 
just a giant industry that is there to stay, to give people careers 
and to support them, but it is not making an impact at the local 
level.7 Am I saying that we need to stop this assistance? No, abso-
lutely not. I am in some ways the beneficiary of this dysfunctional 
international system. But I am saying let us do what makes sense.
Anonymous
But also let me present the view of local people about the 2012 
conflict in Jonglei. The international community is not being 
looked at favourably on the issue of what happened in Pibor 
county [rebellion between Yau Yau, the Murle militia leader, and 
the SPLA, starting in 2010]. The international community was too 
simplistic, in my view, by condemning what the government was 
doing and was never really critical of what Yau Yau and his armed 
militia groups have been doing to the population. 
Every now and then, communities, counties that have nothing 
to do with the army, are being attacked, and nobody has said 
anything. What would you do if there was a situation where your 
property was being raided, even your children in some cases are 
7 Graham Hancock, Lords of 
Poverty: The Power, Prestige, 
and Corruption of the 
International Aid Business, 
New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1989.
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being taken, and people don’t say anything about it? It seems to 
suggest that this is an acceptable practice. So there’s a double 
standard, in the eyes of many South Sudanese, on this particular 
issue.
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5. Stabilization, development and humanitarian 
intervention
There is very little debate on whether we should uphold 
humanitarian principles, whether humanitarian space is 
important, and whether people in need of life-saving assistance 
should get it or not. They’re fairly comprehensively accepted as 
givens. To preserve that, humanitarian actors do try to uphold 
the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. 
Generally we try to de-conflict or separate humanitarian work 
from stabilization work. It sounds simple, but while we can agree 
on the principles, upholding those alongside stabilization work is 
really complicated.
— Joanna Nickolls
Said Mohamed Dahir
Somalia, as you know, is a country where development and human-
itarian projects were pouring in for the last number of decades, 
and there were various reasons why these interventions were 
implemented. One of the rationales was stabilization, whether it 
had that name or not.
Anonymous
I do not see stabilization, if there is such a thing, as separate from 
development or humanitarian action. Stabilization is just a process 
that aims at ensuring that there is stability. These are tools or 
resources or capabilities that you use to enhance that. Have the 
development partners who have thought of this concept called 
stabilization been prioritizing development and humanitarian 
action? The answer is probably no.
You have the UN, both military and civilian, roaming around 
in Juba and across the country for the last eight years in their 
armoured vehicles, with a lot of air conditioning in those V8s, 
but with little to show on the ground. And we are just pouring 
in money, billions and billions and billions and billions. Then we 
keep asking ourselves, why is this not making an impact? Well, it is 
hollow. You are dumping things in a hole. And you want it to make 
an impact in what way?
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Rémy Kasindi
In 1994, we had our experience with the Rwandan refugees in 
the DRC. There were more than a million refugees who installed 
themselves in the east of the country. They were followed by 
humanitarian institutions. But the humanitarian action was 
neutralized by the devastation of the refugee camps by a military 
intervention, which caused an enormous catastrophe that one 
calls humanitarian and is a source of the problem we are living 
through in the east of the DRC.
Joanna Nickolls
There are tensions when humanitarian aid is needed, or it becomes 
possible to deliver it, immediately following a military offensive. 
There’s a concern that this then links the humanitarian work to the 
military work, and makes it less neutral.
Philip Winter
Do not be foolish, do not deceive yourself. Go into a complex, 
conflicted environment with your eyes open, and you will have to 
swallow hard, perhaps, at some of the things that happen when 
you, as an outsider, go into somebody else’s war, into their conflict 
zone, and start bringing in your people, your ideas, and your 
resources.
Nickson Kambale
The actions taken by international institutions have to lead to 
stabilization and not the opposite. Actions in development have 
to be rooted in the sociopolitical realities of an area, and the insti-
tutions called on to implement these actions have to be able to 
question themselves on the basis of people’s expectations and of 
the promises and aims they had made. For example, when STAREC 
was put into place in the eastern DRC, this was, amongst others, a 
response to the situation of all these populations displaced due to 
conflict, but this situation remains unaddressed and even manages 
to poison the relations between the states of the region.
Loochi Muzaliwa
In the humanitarian world, the majority of actors are NGOs. It is, 
however difficult, I think, to envisage a migration from the humani-
tarian to development with NGOs. For example, we have seen that 
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in many countries, millions and millions of dollars have been given 
to NGOs to create employment and production units, but it has 
not really worked. 
Take the case of the Congo. The humanitarian plan for 2014 
numbers several million dollars. This will be dedicated largely to 
the purchase of food supplies, but there is a question here. Do we 
need the distribution of food supplies, or do we need seeds so that 
these communities can cultivate? 
In the territory of Fizi, in southern South Kivu province, there 
is Lake Tanganyika, which is very rich in fish. Other countries, such 
as Zambia and Burundi, to some degree exploit it to their benefit. 
But on the Congolese side, if one suggests projects for industrial 
fishing to respond to the dietary needs of the communities, no 
donor steps up. They say, this we cannot support. If you look at the 
nature of the soil, the soil produces. But for a population which has 
lived in refugee camps for ten or twenty years, used to being given 
food handouts, when this population returns, the same practice 
continues. Maize flour is continuously distributed, while the soil 
on which the population is living is very productive. 
So how in the donors’ minds can we pass from humanitarian 
and external assistance to empowerment in terms of a formal 
economy based on industrialization and production capacity? 
Philip Winter
The international community thinks of a war zone as a place where 
people need food. But if you’re on the ground in Southern Sudan 
during a war—as unfortunately many are now—do you really want 
unground maize? I talked to Nuer mothers who asked me, ‘What 
do you expect me to do with this? I have no grinding stones in 
Upper Nile, which is made of mud and water and grass. I can’t 
grind this stuff. If I boil it up, my children can’t digest it. What are 
you doing?’ 
We put large amounts of food aid into South Sudan during the 
war. We bombed South Sudan, literally, with unground maize. Yet, 
the natural resources of South Sudan are sufficient that the people 
know how to stay alive. This is not a desert. This is a well-watered 
land of grass and fish and trees and wildlife. And people can 
survive.
If you put food into a war zone, soldiers will eat it. I remember 
attending workshops and meetings where this would be discussed, 
and donors would say how worried they were about the effect of 
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the relief operation feeding the soldiers, and I would be deliber-
ately a bit provocative and say, ‘Excuse me. We’ve heard about 
“rights-based programming”. Soldiers have rights, too. Are you 
going to tell me that soldiers can’t eat food that comes into South 
Sudan from the international community? Why? If you don’t 
accept that soldiers will take some portion of this food, you know 
very well that they will just take it anyway’.
Hugo de Vries
One of the problems we had in the first stage of the I4S was the 
dilution of stabilization by comparing it with development, with 
the government and some agencies saying, ‘We do economic 
development, and that will lead to stabilization, because people 
will have jobs’. But that is not necessarily the same thing.
Anonymous
South Sudan is the world’s newest country. The only paved road 
we have is the one that connects Juba, the capital city, with the 
southern town at the border with Uganda, called Nimule, that was 
constructed thanks to money from the US government. That is the 
only paved road we have in South Sudan. A distance of 190 km or 
192 km. That is the only thing we have. For that road, if there were 
to be an insecurity in Nimule that would need the government 
to deploy forces in the area, those would get there very easily, 
without any problem. If the government is required to deploy 
forces in Bor, which is the capital of Jonglei state, the government 
may take days to get forces there to respond. That answers the 
question we are asking here at the conference. If stability involves 
the use of force to respond to a physical threat, then development 
gives you that answer in the form of a road.
Anonymous
If you do development, whatever it is, in a conflict setting, you 
have to do conflict-sensitive planning. Now I don’t understand, 
after two days here, how that is any different from a stabilization 
logic. Of course you will have to take into account the impact of 
your interventions on conflict. Of course conflict prevention will be 
one of the priorities. So I really don’t see it. 
We had this discussion very early on. Some programmes may 
have a label of stabilization. That doesn’t automatically mean very 
37STA B I L I ZAT I O N I N EA ST E R N A ND C E N T R A L A F R I C A
much. Other programmes don’t have that label because the money 
comes from a different track. That doesn’t even necessarily mean 
operationally they are more or less flexible. You have instruments 
in both camps. This was my question to the panel, but maybe now 
it’s a response: I still fail to see the traction that the concept is 
meant to give us, either in terms of operational precision or in any 
other way.
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6. Legitimacy and corruption at the local level 
I spent months trying to listen to communities in the Kivus about 
what they thought about the Congolese military and armed 
groups. I found it extremely difficult to say when, where, and why 
people find power holders legitimate or not. 
— Judith Verweijen
Joanna Nickolls
From a development perspective, there is a lot of vigorous debate 
[in Somalia] over whether capacity-building and support to admin-
istrations can or should start before we have confidence that that 
administration is regarded as legitimate. If legitimacy does matter, 
development actors need to know a lot more than we usually do 
about what legitimacy means to the population in areas that we 
are working in. 
Should the local people be involved in choosing their own 
administrations? Does that mean that capacity development is 
relevant? What about elders and chiefs? What if a federal govern-
ment selects an administration and puts it into an area? It might be 
easy to argue that we should rush in and support new administra-
tions. From a development perspective, there’s an argument that 
it should be more phased and more conditional.
Loochi Muzaliwa
We want to stabilise the communities, but without the commu-
nities. This means that we do it for them, but not with them. An 
African military [AU peacekeeper] deployed in Somalia apparently 
receives USD 2,000 [a month], while a Somali soldier called to 
stabilize the country receives less than USD 100. And in the end, 
we say it is not our affair. It is up to your government, the same 
government that is too weak and that we pretend to stabilize and 
strengthen.
Joanna Nickolls
There is a question of whether stabilization programmes lend 
support to an administration that’s considered legitimate by the 
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international community or whether it’s considered legitimate by 
the local people. A development perspective would be more about 
building social appetite and demand for good governance. 
Anonymous
There is corruption in Somalia, not because Somalis have a propen-
sity for stealing stuff, but because there is an absence of institutions. 
You know, the last five Somali prime minsters were American and 
Canadian, Somalis who have PhDs and who are teaching at univer-
sities in the US. So I have the impression that whoever goes and 
works in Somalia is just going there for the money and to build 
houses in the United Arab Emirates or Malaysia. 
For someone who has worked for the Somali government, I 
honestly don’t remember the US government or UK or China 
or Sweden or Norway giving money to the Somali government. 
Maybe they pay the salaries of Somali soldiers, or maybe they 
sponsor the African Union forces. The first government I know 
that has come to the Somali government, who brought 30 million, 
was Norway, and they controlled their money. So I think we need 
to really look at the facts on the ground. The US has never given 
cash to the Somali government, nor has Canada or China or Japan. 
I think we should be a bit fair to the people who work all their lives 
on the ground trying to fix and better the country.
Emily Paddon
To return to the case of MONUC/MONUSCO and the deployment 
of the intervention brigade [in DRC]. Is the mission going to be 
able to neutralize armed groups and undertake offensive opera-
tions one day, and then the next day foster democratic dialogue 
amongst communities, particularly in communities where some 
of those armed groups have legitimacy and are accepted in the 
absence of an accountable state? 
Hugo de Vries
Are we [MONUSCO] still able to be an honest, apolitical broker 
with this sort of militarization? No, but I am not entirely sure 
people expect that of MONUSCO so much. There are huge expec-
tations that have been raised. MONUSCO has been very unpopular 
in Congo in the last couple of years. The main expectation from 
both the government, and from the population actually, is to 
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support military operations. It is complicated. MONUSCO is stuck 
in that momentum now as well. They are supposed to do military 
operations, the pressure is there, but it is creating not only a lot of 
problems for the honest broker function, but also internally.
Joanna Nickolls
If we don’t have confidence that a government automatically wants 
stabilization, to what extent should we intervene? If we don’t 
believe it’s in the interests of the powerful elite to bring peace, 
can we bring it to them without them wanting it? I would say no, 
and perhaps the argument is that we should focus on building the 
social consensus around peace and then move on to the activities 
that we think will deliver it.
Anonymous
In South Sudan before the crisis, we had our own ‘New Compact 
Deal’. You [Joanna Nickolls] talk about an initiative like that being an 
endeavour to ensure that there’s national ownership. Well, maybe 
you don’t know the particular issues in South Sudan, but I kept 
hearing about it, but nobody came to ask my view even though 
I was in Juba. So how is it supposed to be a ‘national initiative’ 
if it forced upon us national ownership—an ownership decided 
outside the shores of the country. Whose ownership is it really? 
Whose ‘national’? National from where it originates or from where 
it is being given?
Abdirashid Hashi 
In Somalia, and this is a bit ironic, especially in Mogadishu when it 
comes to property rights, it became an agreed belief that anybody 
who has a documented title for a property from the Siad Barre 
government [in power until 1991], everybody considers this a valid 
and legal document. If the owners of property in Mogadishu could 
produce these title deeds, then we assumed that this would make 
it easy to sort out who owns what, and there should not be too 
many problems. 
But when we looked into the situation of Mogadishu, and we 
talked to people, went to the court and went to the district, and 
we did the research, we realized that things are really complicated 
and that there are huge amounts of disputes over properties and 
land. When the civil war erupted, a lot of Somalis who were in 
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Mogadishu left the city, and others took over their properties and 
were using it as theirs for maybe ten or 20 years. Now, Mogadishu 
is getting a little bit of peace, but the owners of these properties 
are coming back, and it creates problems between the occupants 
and those who had those properties.
Some people come up with forged title deeds. Because of 
the war, most of the registries and databases of who owns what 
and when have been destroyed. Actually, there is only one guy in 
Sweden who has the land register for Mogadishu. So if I want to 
buy a property, for example, we contact him, and then he verifies 
who owns what.
Because of the volatility, we have also seen a lot of people just 
making a claim to a property. Although they don’t own anything, 
there is a chance that they will get something. Even if you just 
make the claim or occupy the property, then you may get a fee as 
caretaker of the property, just to get you by.
We think the international community can play a role to 
mitigate and to contribute to stabilization through helping the 
courts, because they are extremely corrupted and weak. One way 
they could help is to support the judiciary so that people can go 
through the courts, and they can get a fair adjudication. Another 
area is strengthening the local mechanisms that help to address 
these issues at the local level, whether it is the traditional elders 
or whoever.
Anonymous
There is a programme in South Sudan trying to create what is 
known as a mobile court system. What this programme wants to 
do is to take judges and lawyers from the centre and move them 
around the country. In the best case, they would be sitting in one 
place for two weeks, or maybe several months, and then come 
back. Is that an efficient way of making sure that justice is made 
accessible to the people? 
Would it not make sense to design a project therefore that 
targets the chiefs, wherever they are across the country and 
actually incorporate them into the judiciary? Since 80% of the cases 
go to them, or more, why do we need judges to move around? 
How expensive is it for these judges to be moved around consid-
ering the fact that you have to fly them in, accommodate them? 
Some of them will be taken from Central Equatoria, which 
is different from Jonglei culturally, and the way the traditional 
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mechanisms work and wisdom would not be understood by these 
people. It is just like taking someone from Kenya to South Sudan 
and giving them the responsibility to adjudicate on issues that they 
do not understand. 
Fred Ngoga
When you’ve been in a place for a while, you tend to think you 
know what’s good for the country. But no one knows better than 
the people of that country. The copy and paste models don’t work. 
And you can’t claim to want to help people and yet not empower 
them. You need to give them the chance to determine what is 
good for them.
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Conclusions
All crises are local.
—Stuart Gordon 
Ken Menkhaus
Weak institutions are critical bottlenecks to stabilization. To put 
it another way: no institutions, no stabilization. Institution-build-
ing takes a long time. But not 500 years. The World Development 
Report says 27.8 I’ll go along with that. It’s a reminder that, for 
all the tools that we have, stabilization generally across the board 
is still a series of blunt instruments in a context where we’d like 
surgical tools.
There is a specific subset of unintended consequences that 
kept coming up in our discussions, a problem that philosophers 
call ‘moral hazard’—an action that is meant to address a problem 
inadvertently incentivizes the behaviour that causes the problem 
in the first place. Stabilization is replete with these dilemmas. We 
don’t want to reward bad behaviour, and yet we want to get some 
of these guys to the table.
Joanna Nickolls
I don’t think we should be doing more education on stabilization. 
I think we should be doing more listening and less talking, hearing 
what it is that people need and trying to deliver on that rather than 
superimposing what we think something means.
Ken Menkhaus
Note that the last four letters ‘-tion’ in a word in English and in 
French have the same meaning: a process. Stabilization implies a 
transitional process from one thing to another, from unstable to 
stable. One of the conventional wisdoms is that in fact, first and 
foremost, stabilization is about a transitional process.
What are the implications of that? Is stabilization doomed to fail? 
I don’t think so. What I think it does is invite us to think about 
8 World Bank, World 
Development Report 2011.
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stabilization differently, with a focus on the idea of a long transi-
tion and the need for stabilization via a strategy of long transition. 
Judith Verweijen
We should realize that everything is inherently political. Clausewitz 
said, ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means’,9 whereas 
Foucault in a book appropriately called Il faut défendre la société, 
said, ‘Politics is the continuation of war by other means’.10 Keeping 
that in mind, it’s undeniable that every decision we make has an 
impact on the distribution of power and resources and that every 
decision is also a product of the distribution of resources—not only 
on the recipient side but also on the so-called intervention side.
Ken Menkhaus
We have got strategies for a completely failed state. Locals build 
coping mechanisms of all sorts, informal mechanisms of order, 
and livelihoods. They can work it out without a state. Inter national 
actors know how to work with completely failed states. We also 
have strategies for stable states. But what about that place in 
between? What about that 27-to-500-year period of transition 
from an unstable to a stable place? Can we come up with trans-
itional strategies? Can stabilization as a concept at least start 
to inform our strategies in places like South Sudan, Congo, and 
Somalia? 
A transitional strategy informed by stabilization would address 
questions like this: how do we as humanitarian actors simultane-
ously work around a weak and dysfunctional state to save lives, 
which is a humanitarian imperative, while finding ways to build up 
the capacity and legitimacy of that state? Can we do both or is this 
mutually exclusive? 
As development agencies working on state-building and rule 
of law, how can we protect local political coping mechanisms, local 
systems of informal justice, rule of law, and security at the same 
time that we build a formal judiciary without undermining that 
thing that local people depend on for their only source of rule of 
law? 
For those working on counter-insurgency, how can we effec-
tively work with local partners whom we absolutely need in order 
to win the counter-insurgency while simultaneously building up 
the capacity of weak and perhaps venal and corrupt government 
security forces? 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom 
Kriege [On war], 3 vols., 
Berlin, 1834.
10 Michel Foucault, ‘Society 
Must Be Defended’: Lectures 
at the Collège de France, 
1975–76, trans. David 
Macey, New York: Picador, 
2003.
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How can we do all of this, build institutions over this long-term 
period, without sacrificing the needs and interests of an entire 
generation of people who are waiting for stabilization to actually 
succeed? That to me is the big question that we have asked. The 
notion of a long transition and the need for a strategy—and I think, 
as a reminder of transition and the importance that it plays in our 
approaches to these local conflicts—indicates stabilization has 
something to offer.
Sagal Sheikh Ali
When I go back to Somalia, I will have a different lens on what 
stabilization means. I will be able to put into perspective the things 
that I have seen there, and how they destabilize the political and 
security situations, and also how they can contribute to stabilizing 
them. Stabilization is a process that either cannot end or does not 
have any sort of middle ground, but because of that, you are able 
to see that process continuously. You can see whether it develops 
in a positive light and also whether it has any sort of negative 
impact on the situations we are in.
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Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia; African 
Union peace enforcement mission 
approved by the UN and operating in 
Somalia since 2007
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHO European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection department, a major 
donor of international aid
FARDC Forces armées de la République 
démocratique du Congo/Armed Forces 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
created during the political transition after 
the end of the Second Congo War (2003–
2006) and consisting of former rebel and 
government forces
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development; regional cooperation body 
established in 1996 and based in Djibouti 
that aims to increase development, security 
and trade; members are Djibouti, Eritrea 
(membership suspended), Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda 
Inga Dams / Inga III Dams located on the cataracts of the Congo 
River in the DRC, 225 km west of Kinshasa; 
two currently functioning at low capacity—
Inga I, built in 1972, and Inga II, built in 
1982; new government plan proposed 
for the Grand Inga, the world’s largest 
hydropower project, the first step being to 
construct Inga III
Islands of stability A concept MONUSCO adopted with 
the overall objective of preventing an 
immediate relapse of communities into a 
cycle of violence after the national army 
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or UN forces have cleared an area in the 
eastern DRC of armed groups.
ISSSS / I4S International Security and Stabilization 
Support Strategy; a UN-led strategy 
initiated during 2008–2009 in the eastern 
provinces of the DRC to support the 
Congolese government in its efforts to build 
up and maintain its presence in areas from 
which armed groups had been cleared; 
second phase launched in December 2013
JNA Joint needs assessment; see RDP
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army. A cult movement 
founded by Joseph Kony in 1988 that 
remains active, if heavily weakened, in the 
borderlands of the Central African Republic 
and the DRC
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
peacekeeping mission created by the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999; 
replaced by MONUSCO in 2010
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; replaced MONUC in 2010; second-
largest UN peacekeeping mission with 
19,000 blue helmets; reinforced in 2013 
by the 3,000-strong UN Force Intervention 
Brigade with the mandate to track down 
and disarm armed groups
Al-Shabaab An extremist Islamic movement that 
emerged in Somalia after the fall of the 
Islamic Courts Union in late 2006
Somali New Deal  A framework agreed in 2013 by the
Compact Federal Government of Somalia and the 
international community, that builds on 
the principles of the 2011 Busan New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. 
With commonly agreed statebuilding and 
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peacebuilding goals it aims to improve the 
alignment of international assistance with 
Somalia’s own national peace-building and 
state-building priorities and to enshrine 
the principle of mutual accountability for 
delivery of the commitments made by 
Somalia and its development partners. 
RDP Somali Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. A national development plan 
for 2008–2012 coordinated by the UN and 
World Bank, resulting from a 2005–2007 
Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) requested by 
the then Transitional Federal Government 
of Somalia.
SSR Security sector reform. A process reforming 
or re-establishing state security forces 
in countries emerging from conflict. It 
commonly involves the army, the police, 
and the security services, as well as the 
judiciary
STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for 
War-Affected Areas; the DRC’s national 
plan launched in 2009 to re-establish 
state authority in the eastern parts of the 
country; first phase of I4S designed to 
support STAREC’s implementation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia: A UN 
mission established in April 1992 to provide 
humanitarian relief, It was augmented by 
the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 
December 1992, which added a military 
component to protect relief missions, 
and was relaunched in March 1993 with a 
peace-enforcement mandate as UNOSOM 
II.
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‘THE CONFERENCE HAS PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE WHAT STABILIZATION 
MEANS IN SOUTH SUDAN AS OPPOSED TO WHAT IT MEANS IN SOMALIA AND 
IN THE DRC. AND PUTTING MY OWN INSIGHTS ON STABILIZATION ALONGSIDE 
THOSE OF THE SPEAKERS HERE HAS GIVEN ME A DIFFERENT LENS THROUGH 
WHICH TO UNDERSTAND AND EVALUATE EVENTS IN SOMALIA.’  
                                    —Sagal Sheikh Ali, Somali Women Development Center 
‘WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND STABILIZATION AS A PROCESS THAT IS 
GROUNDED IN LOCAL CONTEXTS AND ACHIEVED OVER TIME.’ 
                                                                       —Zacharia Diing Akol, Sudd Institute
‘WHAT PEOPLE ARE CALLING FOR IS THEIR OWN SOLUTION TO THEIR CRISIS, 
BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND THEIR CRISIS BETTER. PEOPLE ACROSS 
THESE REGIONS ARE READY TO ASSERT THEIR OWN RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND THIS IS REALLY KEY.’ 
                           —Mvemba Dizolele, Professorial Lecturer of African Studies,  
                                                                            Johns Hopkins University SAIS
In March 2014, the Rift Valley Institute (RVI), through the Rift Valley 
Forum, together with the University of Gothenburg convened a regional 
conference on stabilization at the Kenya School of Government in 
Nairobi. The conference attracted some ninety participants from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and South Sudan—
people involved in civil society, government, the UN and the donor and 
diplomatic communities. Academics and specialists from Europe and 
North America also participated. The objective of the two-day conference 
was to question, review, evaluate and exchange lessons on stabilization 
programmes in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan with the aim of 
informing policies that enhance peace and security in eastern and central 
Africa. This report presents highlights from this gathering and in no way 
aims to reproduce the debates and their conclusions in full. Giving space 
to voices from countries that are subject to stabilization programmes is 
central to this report. Their statements, explanations and clarifications 
are complemented here by those of regional and international specialists 
and experienced practitioners in international aid, development and 
stabilization.
